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ABSTRACT  Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are devices primarily intended to allow agents to move prosthetic 
limbs, wheelchairs, and other mechanisms by forming intentions or performing certain mental actions. In this paper I 
illustrate how the use of BCIs leads to two unique and unrecognized problems of moral luck. In short, it seems that 
agents who depend upon BCIs for bodily movement or the use of other mechanisms (henceforth “BCI-agents”) may end 
up deserving of blame and legal punishment more so than standard counterparts simply due to factors beyond their control. 
My aim is to explore whether we can avoid the implication that BCI-agents are subject to these unique sources of moral 
luck. In doing so I offer a number of possible solutions and then defend one of these solutions as the best. As it turns 
out, the solution I defend addresses both problems of moral luck at once and has broader implications for theorizing 





Human agency is mediated in diverse ways. We speak, write, sign, or type to communicate. We move 
with legs, wheelchairs, or prosthetics. We grasp with hands, feet, or mouths. And yet, the use of these 
can be either absent or lost due to congenital conditions, injury, or degenerative diseases. One example 
is amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), a degenerative neurological disease that affects the nerve cells 
required for voluntary muscle movement.1 While conditions like ALS threaten to limit agency, brain-
computer interfaces offer the prospect of restoring agency in significant ways. Brain-computer 
interfaces (BCIs) are devices that allow agents to move prosthetic limbs, wheelchairs, or other 
mechanisms by forming intentions or performing mental actions.2  
Though BCI technology is in relatively early stages, there are signs of promise.3 One study focuses 
on a 51-year-old man with advanced ALS: 
 
he was using an eyegaze device to interact with family and friends and to run his NIH-funded research 
laboratory. However, as his eye movements weakened, the device became unreliable, and he and his 
family despaired of his being able to continue the independent communication essential to his quality 
of life and to his professional productivity.4 
 
With the use of a BCI at home and work, his agency has been significantly restored: “he writes 
manuscripts and grant proposals, sends e-mail, and reads scientific articles...the BCI controls standard 
software programs...He also uses the BCI for environmental control and entertainment, such as 
controlling the room lighting and the television.”5 When requested to explain how the BCI has made 
a difference in his life, he used the BCI to reply via email: “I couldn’t run my lab without BCI. I do 
molecular neuroscience research and my grant pays three people.”6  
As BCIs become more advanced, people will use them for broader ranges of function that they 
otherwise wouldn’t have. As this gets closer to becoming a reality, however, potential problems arise 
with respect to moral responsibility. In this paper I illustrate how the future use of BCIs lead to two 
unique and unrecognized problems of moral luck. In short, it seems that agents who depend upon 
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BCIs for bodily movement and other functions (henceforth “BCI-agents”) may end up deserving of 
blame and legal punishment more so than standard counterparts simply due to factors beyond their 
control.7 My aim is to explore whether we can avoid the implication that BCI-agents are subject to 
these unique sources of moral luck. I offer a number of possible solutions and then defend one of 
these solutions as the best. As it turns out, the solution I defend addresses both problems of moral 
luck at once. While the following discussion bears directly on questions concerning the moral and 
legal responsibility of BCI-agents, the considerations raised have broader implications for theorizing 
about moral luck as well as the epistemic condition on moral responsibility.  
 
 
2. BCIs, Moral Luck, and Blameworthiness 
 
BCIs are designed to recognize brain events that are correlated with certain intentions or mental 
actions and subsequently cause the corresponding movement or event in the relevant prosthetic limb 
or assisting device (e.g., a wheelchair, word processing application, etc.). For example, a BCI might 
recognize some brain activity in an agent as a proximal intention to raise their arm and consequently 
cause the agent’s prosthetic arm to rise.  
The proficient use of a BCI requires substantial instruction and training.8 This is related to the fact 
that designing BCIs to recognize the right sorts of brain activity (and to ignore the wrong sorts) is a 
matter of precision. The difference, for example, between brain activity correlated with the mental 
event of vividly imagining raising one’s arm may be subtly (though importantly) different than brain 
activity correlated with the mental event of actively intending to do so. Thus, BCIs could possibly 
misrecognize the former mental event as the latter. As Rainey et al. point out, this means that the 
control agents exercise via BCIs is often relatively limited, and that the operation of a BCI is often 
paired with limited foreseeability regarding its outcomes.9 This naturally raises concerns about whether 
(and the degree to which) BCI-agents are responsible or blameworthy for their BCI-mediated 
behaviour. To illustrate this concern, consider the following cases: 
 
INERT IMAGINATION: Standard Saul is seated at a dull faculty meeting. As his mind wanders, he 
nonvoluntarily begins to vividly imagine tossing the glass of water he is holding into his colleague’s 
face. Of course, he does not seriously consider doing this, and the meeting continues uninterrupted. 
 
ACTIVE IMAGINATION: BCI-Paul is just like Standard Saul, except that he depends upon BCI to 
control his prosthetic arms. When Paul nonvoluntarily begins to vividly imagine tossing his glass of 
water into his colleague’s face, his BCI mistakenly recognizes this as a “control command” to move 
his prosthetic arm, and as a result his prosthetic arm tosses the water into his colleague’s face.  
 
Standard Saul is not blameworthy for anything in this case. And there are good reasons to think 
that neither is BCI-Paul. The first reason is articulated in the view that one cannot be (directly) 
blameworthy for nonvoluntary items.10 And if one isn’t blameworthy for such things, then one cannot 
be blameworthy for the consequences of such things.11 Since BCI-Paul’s bodily behaviour is simply 
the result of nonvoluntary mental events, it’s implausible that he is responsible for anything in this 
case, including the fact that his prosthetic arm tossed water into his colleague’s face. 
The second reason to think that BCI-Paul is not blameworthy is articulated in the Comparative 
Control Principle: 
 
CCP: Two agents cannot differ with respect to their blameworthiness if the only differences 
between them are due to factors beyond their control.12, 13 
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Standard Saul isn’t blameworthy for anything. And the only difference between Saul and BCI-Paul 
is due to factors beyond Paul’s control (i.e., the device’s misrecognition). If CCP is correct, then Paul 
is not blameworthy for tossing water in his colleague’s face. 
CCP is controversial, however. Some argue that agents can be subject to moral luck, where an 
agent’s moral responsibility or blameworthiness is due at least in part to factors outside of his control.14 
Much of the literature on moral luck has focused on outcome luck. To illustrate, consider two agents 
who each drive recklessly down a dark street at night: the first driver swerves onto an empty sidewalk, 
but the second driver swerves onto a sidewalk where pedestrians happen to be present, hitting and 
killing them. Both drivers perform qualitatively identical actions in their driving. The only difference 
between them concerns the outcomes of their actions, and yet this difference depends only upon factors 
that are not under their control (i.e., whether pedestrians were present). While the only difference 
between the two drivers lies in factors beyond their control, a number of theorists have found it 
intuitive that the second driver is more blameworthy (i.e., deserving of more severe blame) than the 
first.15  
If this intuition is correct, then CCP is false. However, others may be inclined to maintain CCP 
and deny that this sort of moral luck exists, arguing that it is fundamentally unfair to judge one agent 
as more blameworthy for a difference in outcomes that is completely due to factors beyond their 
control. Fortunately, the concern about agents like BCI-Paul can be resolved while sidestepping this 
controversy over moral luck, since we can appeal to the first reason offered concerning 
nonvoluntariness: Paul isn’t blameworthy for nonvoluntarily imagining something, and if he isn’t 
blameworthy for this, then he isn’t blameworthy for its unfortunate consequence.  
While the above concern is easily resolved, further reflection upon how BCIs might malfunction 
leads to a more formidable problem of moral luck. As Miller writes, 
 
[T]he concerns with moral luck raised by BCI-mediated behaviour extend beyond [Rainey et. al’s] 
observation that involuntary mental events might result in overt behaviour. A distinct problem of moral 
luck arises from the possibility that BCIs may misrecognize a voluntarily formed distal intention (e.g., a 
plan to commit some illicit act in the future) as a control command to perform some overt behaviour 
now.16 
 
This problem can be illustrated with the following pair of cases: 
 
ABANDONED PLAN: Typical Terry stands with his business rival, Gary, on top of a skyscraper (their 
usual meeting place for arranging high-stakes business deals). Terry judges that it might become 
advantageous to get rid of Gary. Inspired by the view, Terry voluntarily forms a plan to shove Gary 
off of the skyscraper on some future occasion (if, for example, their business dealings go south). 
Moments later, however, Terry has a crisis of conscience and consequently abandons his plan. 
 
PREMATURE EXECUTION: BCI-Barry is just like Typical Terry except that he depends upon a BCI 
to control his prosthetic arms. Through instruction, Barry has become aware that BCIs can 
misrecognize distal intentions to Φ later as proximal intentions to Φ now. When Barry voluntarily 
forms a plan to shove Gary off of the skyscraper on some future occasion, his BCI misrecognizes this 
as a proximal intention, resulting in Barry’s prosthetic arms shoving Gary off of the skyscraper to his 
death.17 
 
This case-pair gives rise to a more serious problem when paired with two additional 
considerations. The first consideration is that there seems to be no relevant difference between Typical 
Terry and BCI-Barry with respect to their control. To see this we can stipulate that, if it weren’t for 
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his BCI’s misrecognition, Barry also would have succumbed to pangs of conscience shortly after 
forming his plan and abandoned it. But then the only difference between Barry’s plan and Terry’s plan 
(such that Barry’s resulted in someone’s death and Terry’s did not) is due to factors beyond Barry’s 
control.18  
The second consideration is that, even so, there are reasons to think that BCI-Barry is more 
blameworthy than Typical Terry.19 After all, bringing about Gary’s death is significantly worse than 
momentarily intending to do so. Now, we can stipulate that BCI-Barry did not in fact realize the risk 
he was taking when he formed this distal intention.20 Nevertheless, since Gary’s death seems to be the 
foreseeable outcome of voluntarily forming his plan to kill Gary, we cannot excuse Barry by appealing to 
the idea that agents cannot be directly blameworthy for nonvoluntary events or their outcomes.21   
If the foregoing considerations are correct, they leave us with the troubling result that Barry is 
more blameworthy than Terry, and yet that the difference between the two agents is just a matter of 
luck. So, unless and until BCI devices are developed to be failsafe, their use puts BCI-agents at a risk 
of increased blameworthiness due to factors beyond their control. Thus, BCI-agents may unluckily 
end up being more blameworthy than standard counterparts across a range of cases.  
 
 
3. A Distinct Problem for BCIs? 
 
One might aim to ameliorate the concern at hand by drawing attention to the fact that we are all 
vulnerable to outcome luck in various ways. For example, whether one is blameworthy only for 
negligently leaving the gas on in one’s stove or also blameworthy for a gas explosion may hinge upon 
factors outside of one’s control (e.g., whether someone happens to light a candle nearby). And whether 
one is blameworthy merely for running a red light or also for hitting a pedestrian after doing so can 
depend upon factors beyond one’s control. If outcome luck exists at all then this is so. Furthermore, 
one might point out that we all use mechanisms that are prone to malfunction. If so, the problem of 
luck I’m drawing attention may not be specific to BCIs and their users, but rather a problem about 
mechanism malfunction more generally.  
This response neglects the fact that, given the fallibility of BCI devices, BCI-agents are subject to 
an additional source of outcome luck by which they are uniquely affected. First, even though many of 
the mechanisms we use are prone to malfunction, that doesn’t mean that, whenever they malfunction 
and cause some harmful outcome, we’re blameworthy for the outcome. After all, if someone does 
something entirely permissible and a bad outcome unluckily occurs, it’s hard to see how we can 
justifiably blame them for the outcome unless they’re blameworthy for performing the action that led 
to the outcome (e.g., if the action itself was negligent or reckless).22 In contrast, I’m supposing that 
BCI-agents like Barry (and other BCI-agents discussed below) perform mental actions (they have 
voluntarily formed distal intentions to do something wrong) for which they’re blameworthy. Now, we may 
all form blameworthy distal intentions. But those of us who don’t rely upon BCIs to carry them out 
don’t run the same risk of having distal intentions translated into overt consequences then and there. 
Second, consider any fallible mechanism that agents who are not disabled rely upon—for example, 
a steering wheel that might malfunction, veering the car left or right. Now replace that agent with a 
BCI-agent who uses a BCI to control his prosthetic arms. That BCI-agent now has two sources of 
possible outcome luck: malfunction of the steering wheel mechanism plus malfunction of his BCI. 
Even if the steering wheel doesn’t malfunction, the BCI might. And this can apply to any number of 
cases in which BCI-agents use a fallible mechanism (i.e., a BCI) to use another fallible mechanism 
(e.g., a steering wheel). In such cases the potential for unlucky outcomes is double-layered. 
Lastly, agents who depend upon BCIs for functionality may almost always have the potential for 
luck even when they’re not using another mechanism, whereas this isn’t the case for other agents. 
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Given that it would seem particularly unfair if BCI-agents were subject to an additional layer of luck, 
it’s worth exploring whether we can avoid it.23 
Before considering possible solutions to this problem, I raise a second, perhaps more troubling 
problem of luck that arises for BCI-agents with respect to punishment. In the following section I 
develop this problem, and in Section 5 I suggest a solution that resolves both problems of luck. 
 
 
4. BCIs, Moral Luck, and Deserved Punishment 
 
A second problem of moral luck arises from recognizing a parallel between BCI-Barry’s case and cases 
of involuntary manslaughter. Consider the following: 
 
MALFUNCTION: Jerry works hard but struggles to make ends meet. He drives his car to and from 
work, which is five miles from his home. Unfortunately, the steering mechanism on his car occasionally 
malfunctions and momentarily veers the car slightly to the right. Jerry wishes that he could have it 
repaired but cannot afford to. To make matters worse, there is no available public transportation Jerry 
can use to get to work instead, and there are no other jobs available to him that are nearer to his home. 
One evening while driving home from work, his car’s steering mechanism malfunctions, the car veers 
slightly to the right, and the car hits and kills a pedestrian walking on the side of the road. 
 
Jerry did not intentionally kill the pedestrian. Moreover, the car’s veering to the right isn’t even an 
action on Jerry’s part. By all accounts, the pedestrian’s death was an accident. But Jerry is plausibly 
deserving of legal punishment for involuntary manslaughter. The steering mechanism’s malfunction 
and the death that resulted from it were foreseeable outcomes of Jerry’s voluntarily driving the car.  
BCI-Barry’s case is analogous. Given that the connection between Barry’s distal intention and the 
movement of his prosthetic arm is causally deviant, the movement of Barry’s prosthetic arms hardly 
constitutes an action. Nevertheless, Barry’s BCI device is known to occasionally malfunction by 
misrecognizing brain activity (or mental events correlated with such activity) and resultingly causing 
unintended movement of Barry’s prosthetic limbs. The BCI is therefore analogous to Jerry’s car, which 
is known to occasionally malfunction by veering to the right. Furthermore, Gary’s death was a 
foreseeable outcome of Barry’s voluntarily forming his distal intention, as the pedestrian’s death was 
a foreseeable outcome of Jerry’s voluntarily driving his car. 
One might think there’s a difference. We can suppose that Jerry was aware of the risk he was 
taking by deciding to continue to use his car. In contrast, I have stipulated that BCI-Barry was not 
aware of the relevant risk he was taking at the time that he voluntarily formed his distal intention to 
kill Gary. Regardless, it doesn’t seem that this succeeds in driving a wedge between the two cases. For, 
we can simply suppose that, when Jerry drove his car home that evening, he wasn’t attending to the risk 
that doing so posed. But, of course, we wouldn’t think that this excuses him. Rather, we would readily 
point out that Jerry should have been aware of the risk. Given this, we need a reason to think that we 
can’t say the same for BCI-Barry, given Barry’s general awareness of the risks that BCIs pose.  
The strength of these similarities lends considerable support for the claim that, if Jerry deserves 
to be punished for the pedestrian’s death, then BCI-Barry deserves to be punished for Gary’s death. 
And since it seems that Jerry deserves legal punishment for the pedestrian’s death, it would seem to 
follow that Barry deserves legal punishment for Gary’s death.24  
But now return to the comparison between BCI-Barry and Typical Terry, and recall that BCI-
Barry differs from Typical Terry only with respect to factors outside of his control. With this in mind, 
consider an analogue of the Comparative Control Principle which focuses, not on blameworthiness, 
but on deserved punishment: 
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CCPDP: Two agents cannot differ with respect to their desert of punishment if the only 
differences between them are due to factors beyond their control. 
 
It seems unfair to judge that BCI-Barry is deserving of rather severe punishment when Terry is 
not. This especially so since the primary difference between the two agents is just that Barry depends 
upon his BCI for bodily movement, and that Barry’s dependence upon his BCI is, we may suppose, 
beyond his control. As with the Comparative Control Principle, so it may be with CCPDP: perhaps 
luck with respect to deserved punishment is unavoidable. Nevertheless, it’s worth exploring whether 
there is a principled way to avoid an additional and unique species of this type of luck that would stem 
from reliance on BCIs. 
 
 
5. Defending a Solution to the Two Problems  
 
There are at least three general ways to avoid the result that BCI-Barry is deserving of punishment for 
Gary’s death and therefore subject to a unique source of moral luck that standard counterparts are 
not. In what follows I consider each, and then defend a solution that dissolves both the problem of 
luck concerning punishment and the problem of luck concerning blameworthiness.25 Consider the 
following possible solutions: 
 
Solution 1 denies that the difference between BCI-Barry and Typical Terry is just a matter of luck, 
and accordingly attempts to establish a relevant difference in control between the two agents. If 
this attempt succeeds, then Barry’s deserving punishment is not truly an instance of outcome luck, 
and the problem does not arise. The most obvious candidate for a difference in control is this: 
since Barry has a general awareness of the possibility that his BCI may malfunction, he has the 
ability to avoid the sort of outcome in question simply by refraining from forming any intentions 
(distal or otherwise) that might be mistakenly translated into action right away. If he has this ability, 
then Gary’s resulting death is not due to factors that are entirely beyond Barry’s control.  
 
Solution 2 grants that the difference between BCI-Barry and Typical Terry is just a matter of luck 
and that they are equally deserving (or undeserving) of some legal punishment. On this solution, 
both Barry and Terry are deserving of punishment. This is implausible, however. Even if Terry is 
deserving of blame for voluntarily forming the intention to kill Gary, there’s no plausible candidate 
for which Terry deserves punishment. Although it is reasonable to maintain that agents are 
sometimes deserving of punishment for attempted crimes, such attempts are typically identified with 
actions that agents take toward the realization of their plans. Thus, an assassin who shoots at but 
misses his target is plausibly deserving of punishment for attempted murder in virtue of shooting 
at his target. In contrast, Typical Terry never takes any active steps towards realizing this plan, 
since he abandons his plan shortly after forming it. Solution 2 can therefore be dismissed. 
 
Solution 3, like the previous solution, grants that the difference between BCI-Barry and Typical 
Terry is just a matter of luck and that they are equally deserving (or undeserving) of legal 
punishment. Solution 3 differs from Solution 2, however, in that it maintains that neither Barry nor 
Terry is deserving of any legal punishment. There are two ways to defend this contention: 
 
Solution 3.1 maintains that BCI-Barry is not even blameworthy for Gary’s death. Since deserved 
punishment for Φ plausibly requires deserved blame for Φ, it would follow that Barry is not 
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deserving of punishment for Gary’s death.26 However, given the details of the case, it’s not 
immediately obvious how Barry might be excused. Barry’s awareness of the possibility of BCI 
malfunction (even if not occurrent) seems to make Gary’s death a foreseeable upshot of his 
voluntary mental action of forming his plan. However, this solution merits a closer look. 
 
Solution 3.2 maintains that BCI-Barry is blameworthy for Gary’s death but not deserving of 
punishment for it. However, this solution is undermotivated. It is, of course, true that being 
blameworthy for Φ is not sufficient for being deserving of legal punishment for Φ. We would 
not, for example, think that blameworthiness for purely mental actions (e.g., deciding to tell 
an insensitive joke), relatively trivial actions (e.g., telling an insensitive joke), or relatively trivial 
consequences thereof (someone’s hurt feelings) suffices for deserving legal punishment for 
those things. But this solution grants that Barry is in fact blameworthy for something quite 
serious, viz., bringing about someone’s death. It’s implausible that something so severe 
(supposing one is blameworthy for it) could fail meet the appropriate standard for deserving 
legal punishment.  
 
Solution 1 and Solution 3.1 remain. I what follows I defend Solution 3.1 over Solution 1. We can 
begin by taking a closer look at how Solution 1 aims to establish a relevant difference in control 
between Typical Terry and BCI-Barry. The defender of Solution 1 can maintain that, through BCI 
instruction, Barry has acquired a general ability to foresee malfunction-caused outcomes of distal 
intentions (in this case, plans to perform some action at a later time). Either before or during the 
formation of distal intentions, Barry is able to attend to his awareness of possible BCI-malfunction 
and thus foresee the sort of outcomes that might result from forming those intentions. A proponent 
of Solution 1 might plausibly argue that these facts are sufficient for Gary’s death being a foreseeable 
outcome of Barry’s voluntarily formed plan. And, since Gary’s death was foreseeable for Barry, the 
proponent of Solution 1 might continue, Barry could have avoided that consequence by refraining 
from forming his plan on the basis of such foresight. If this is so, then Barry is blameworthy for Gary’s 
death. 
Whether Solution 1 succeeds, however, depends upon the distinction between an outcome’s being 
foreseeable and an outcome’s being reasonably foreseeable.27 Gary’s death is plausibly foreseeable for 
BCI-Barry. But whether it is reasonable to expect Barry to foresee this is quite another question. And, 
if it’s not reasonable to have expected Barry to foresee this, then it’s implausible that he is blameworthy 
for it.28 More generally, it would be unreasonable to expect BCI-agents like Barry to foresee such 
consequences because fulfilling this expectation would seem to require that BCI-agents constantly 
monitor each of their intentions or plans—no matter how momentary and fleeting—with an eye to 
the mere possibility that such intentions or plans might be misrecognized by their BCIs. This seems 
to require either an extraordinary capacity for attention and consideration that ordinary humans simply 
don’t have, or else that BCI-agents deliberate, form intentions, and live in perpetual slow motion in 
order to ensure that they always cover all of their bases, as it were. Even if BCI-agents have the general 
ability to foresee such outcomes, it doesn’t follow from this that it’s reasonable to expect the agent to 
exercise such abilities in the way that would be required to avoid them. 
This is bolstered by the experience of people with conditions such as ALS training to use BCIs. 
One study provides qualitative feedback from BCI users in focus groups who described their 
experience using a BCI spelling device:  
 
Four of the eight social groups also expressed concern over the psychological issue of cognitive 
fatigue involved in using a BCI. These participants doubted their psychological capacity to manage 
fatigue caused by using the P300 speller, and believed that their endurance would limit the usability 
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of this technology. ‘. . .I don’t know, I just wonder what my stamina would be. . . I personally wonder 
how long I’d be able to do that. . . I have doubts that I’d be able to do it for, like, over an hour or so 
at a time.’29 
 
Five of the eight social units remarked that it was psychologically challenging to maintain focus on 
the spelling task during inevitable, yet unexpected, events. ‘And you’re sitting there trying to focus on 
the screen, and all of the sudden the ice cube maker, you know, drops ice cubes. Your train of 
thought gets staggered. Same thing if a dog was barking outside, or somebody. . .the phone rings, just 
any normal noise that you would hear in a house can be distracting while you’re trying to focus on 
that.’30 
 
Importantly, BCI use is cognitively taxing, and while further technological development may reduce 
this cognitive load, it may not eliminate it entirely. 
As Rainey et. al rightly point out, there is reason to treat differently cases in which able-bodied 
agents temporarily employ the use of BCIs for recreation (e.g., using BCIs to control drones), on the one 
hand, and cases where persons with disabilities are dependent on the constant use of BCIs in an effort to 
approximate an average standard of bodily agency.31 In the former type of case, it may be reasonable 
to expect able-bodied agents to exercise an extraordinary level of caution for the temporary period 
that they are using a BCI for recreation. But the expectation that persons with disabilities perpetually 
sustain this level of caution and attention throughout their daily lives sets a requirement that would be 
unfairly psychologically burdensome. Thus, while Solution 1 identifies a notable difference between 
BCI-agents and their standard counterparts, there is reason to think that this difference is (at least 
often) not a responsibility-relevant difference. This same point also provides reason to doubt that 
BCI-agents like Barry are blameworthy for the type of consequences of which Gary’s death is an 
instance.  
At this point a defender of Solution 1 may grant that it’s unreasonable to expect BCI-agents to 
monitor all of their intentions. And yet, it may nevertheless be reasonable to expect BCI-agents to 
monitor a suitably restricted subset of their intentions, i.e., violent or murderous ones. If so, then 
consequences of this sort of intention would be reasonably foreseeable for BCI-agents and thus 
avoidable. On this basis, the defender of Solution 1 may conclude that there is in fact a relevant 
difference in control between BCI-Barry and Typical Terry: Gary’s death on that occasion was a 
reasonably foreseeable result of Barry’s plan, but not Terry’s.  
This defense on behalf of Solution 1 succeeds only if the scope of intentions BCI-agents must 
monitor can plausibly be reduced to the point at which it would be reasonable to expect them to do 
so (and thus foresee the relevant outcomes). But it’s far from clear that this is possible. Consider the 
following two cases that involve BCI-agents: 
 
TAX FRAUD: Carrie is filing her annual tax return online. She has refrained from entering information 
about some under-the-table earnings for that year. Though she has intermittently experienced feelings 
of guilt about this omission, she has so far been able to keep these guilty feelings at bay. At the final 
step in the filing process, Carrie needs only to select ‘enter’ on her keyboard to submit her tax returns. 
If she does so, she will have committed tax fraud. At that moment, Carrie is distracted by a text message 
notification from her phone. She reflexively checks her phone for a message she has been waiting for 
and begins typing a reply. As she does so, it occurs to her that she hasn’t yet submitted her tax return, 
and voluntarily forms a plan to submit them after she finishes replying to the text message. However, 
Carrie’s BCI misrecognizes this as a proximal intention to submit her tax return now, resulting in her 
prosthetic hand reaching back to her computer keyboard and clicking ‘enter.’ Her tax return is 
submitted, and it is fraudulent. If it weren’t for her BCI’s malfunction, Carrie’s guilt-feelings would 
have returned, and she would have abandoned her plan to submit the fraudulent tax return. 
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SPEEDER: Sherry is out for a drive in her new car. Cruising on the highway just at the speed limit, 
Sherry wants to see how quickly her new car can accelerate to a higher speed. While considering this, 
Sherry feels a bit light-headed and realizes that she hasn’t eaten all day. She figures that accelerating to 
a higher speed on an empty stomach might be nauseating, and voluntarily forms a plan to test her car’s 
acceleration after stopping for lunch. However, Sherry’s BCI misrecognizes this plan as a proximal 
intention to accelerate now, resulting in her prosthetic leg pressing down hard on the gas pedal, quickly 
accelerating well past the speed limit. Were it not for her BCI’s malfunction, Carrie would have 
rethought her reckless plan over lunch and refrained from speeding. 
 
These cases help illustrate that the scope of intentions or plans to be monitored by BCI-agents is 
significantly broader than murderous or violent intentions. And, of course, cases of this kind could be 
multiplied indefinitely. Importantly, the broader the set of such cases is, the less plausible it is that it’s 
reasonable to expect such agents to monitor these intentions and thereby foresee their possible 
consequences.32 The result is that, even if such consequences are foreseeable, they are plausibly not 
reasonably foreseeable.33 If this is so, then Solution 1 fails.34, 35 
Solution 3.1 remains. We needn’t, however, accept Solution 3.1 simply as the result of the forgoing 
process of elimination. Instead, notice that Solution 3.1 is essentially a denial of what Solution 1 
affirms. Solution 1 maintains that BCI-Barry is blameworthy (and deserving of punishment) for Gary’s 
death, while Solution 3.1 maintains that BCI-Barry is not blameworthy (and thus not deserving of 
punishment) for Gary’s death. My argument against Solution 1 is, in effect, an argument for the truth 
of Solution 3.1.  
More explicitly, my argument for Solution 3.1 is a conjunction of two claims: (i) an agent is 
blameworthy for an outcome of some action only if the outcome was reasonably foreseeable for the 
agent at the time of the action, and (ii) the outcome in question was not reasonably foreseeable for 
BCI-Barry at the time of his earlier mental action. These claims jointly entail that BCI-Barry is not 
blameworthy for the outcome in question, and thus not deserving of punishment (the same goes for 
other relevantly similar BCI-agents like Carrie and Sherry).  
In my argument against Solution 1 I focused primarily on defending (ii), while taking (i) as a shared 
assumption that even the defender of Solution 1 attempts to employ as part of their argument for it 
(the appeal the defender of Solution 1 makes to (i) misleadingly trades on the linguistic ambiguity 
between “foreseeable” and “reasonably foreseeable”). Furthermore, the fact that (i) is widely accepted 
among theorists tells in its favor.36  
A positive argument for (i) can be made on the grounds that it’s required to preserve the link 
between blameworthiness and fairness. This argument begins from the premise that it’s fair to blame 
an agent for something only if it’s reasonable to expect the agent to have avoided it.37 We can apply 
this premise to outcomes: it’s fair to blame an agent for the outcome of their action only if it’s 
reasonable to expect the agent to avoid that outcome. But it’s reasonable to expect an agent to avoid 
an outcome only if it’s reasonable to expect them to be aware that the outcome might result from 
their action. And this is so only if the outcome is reasonably foreseeable for the agent at the time of 
the action. It follows from these considerations that it’s fair to blame someone for an outcome only 
if the outcome was reasonably foreseeable for the agent at the time of their action. This reasoning 
establishes claim (i): an agent is blameworthy for an outcome of some action only if the outcome was 
reasonably foreseeable for the agent at the time of the action. This, conjoined with claim (ii) (that the 
outcome in question was not reasonably foreseeable for BCI-Barry at the time of his earlier mental 
action), entails that BCI-Barry is not blameworthy for the outcome (i.e., Gary’s death). The same goes, 
mutatis mutandis, for other BCI-agents. If the foregoing reasoning is sound, then Solution 3.1 is correct. 
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Notice that Solution 3.1 at once dissolves the problem of blameworthiness and the problem of 
deserved punishment for BCI-agents. Blameworthiness for some item is plausibly a necessary 
condition for deserving punishment for it. As Douglas Husak writes, “Penal liability subjects persons 
to state punishment, and any respectable justification of punishment requires persons to be morally 
blameworthy”.38 Since blameworthiness is plausibly a precondition of deserved punishment, a 
successful argument that BCI-Barry is not blameworthy for Gary’s death also implies that neither is 
he deserving of punishment for it. This conclusion generalizes for other BCI-agents whose bodily 
movements (and their upshots) are not reasonably foreseeable results of voluntary mental actions.39  
 
 
6. Apology, Agent-Regret, and Relationship-Alteration 
 
I’ve offered an argument that the BCI-agents discussed here aren’t deserving of blame or punishment 
for the outcomes of their mental actions. In doing so, I have denied that they are subject to an 
additional source of outcome luck by which they are uniquely affected. However, one may feel that, 
if we simply stop here, there’s something left unresolved. Although BCI-Barry isn’t blameworthy for 
Gary’s death, something would seem lacking if he simply shrugged it off. And even if Barry sincerely 
thinks of Gary’s death as regrettable, something still seems missing. So, although it wouldn’t be 
appropriate to blame Barry for Gary’s death, or for Barry to experience feelings of guilt for it, there 
may be some related attitude or activity that would be appropriate: something in between mere regret, 
on one hand, and blame, on the other. Here I briefly explore three such possibilities. 
One possibility is what theorists have called agent-regret. As mentioned, it would seem insufficient 
for BCI-Barry to merely feel regret with respect to Gary’s death. After all, anyone might reasonably feel 
regret about his death, even if they had nothing at all to do with it. Bernard Williams’ distinction 
between “regret in general” and agent-regret is helpful here.40 Regret in general can be appropriately 
felt by anyone who is aware of an unfortunate state of affairs or event: one may sincerely wish that 
things had been otherwise. Agent-regret, in contrast, is only appropriately felt by an agent who is 
related to the outcome via his or her own agency. As Williams explains, “The sentiment of agent-
regret is by no means restricted to voluntary agency. It can extend far beyond what one intentionally 
did to almost anything for which one was causally responsible in virtue of something one intentionally 
did.”41 The notion of agent-regret seems to fit well with the BCI-agents discussed here, whose 
voluntary plans accidentally result in outcomes via involuntary events. These agents are partly causally 
responsible for these outcomes, but not morally responsible. Agent-regret might fill the attitude gap 
where blame or guilt wouldn’t be appropriate, since the appropriateness of agent-regret falls 
somewhere between being unrelated to some outcome and being blameworthy for it. Williams 
illustrates: 
 
The lorry driver who, through no fault of his, runs over a child, will feel differently from any spectator... 
Doubtless, and rightly, people will try, in comforting him, to move the driver from this state of feeling, 
move him indeed from where he is to something more like the place of a spectator; but it is important 
that this is seen as something that should need to be done, and indeed some doubt would be felt about 
a driver who too blandly or too readily moved to that position...there is something special about his 
relation to this happening, something which cannot merely be eliminated by the consideration that it 
was not his fault.42 
 
Marcia Baron describes agent-regret as involving a distinctive kind of pain. Of Williams’ lorry 
driver, she writes, “The pain that the driver feels about what happened is not just pain about that. He 
was centrally involved in what happened; indeed, he was the agent. That he was the agent, even though 
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what he did was unintentional and even unforeseeable, is ineliminably a part of what he feels.”43 
Baron’s observation can be adapted for BCI-agents: although the movement of his arms doesn’t 
constitute an action on Barry’s part, his mental action is an exercise of agency through which the 
subsequent outcome came about. Thus, he might appropriately feel a distinctive sort of pain upon 
reflecting that his own agency was (albeit in a causally deviant way) a conduit of Gary’s death.  
A second possibility concerns the notion of relationship-alteration as developed by T. M. Scanlon. 
While both agent-regret focuses on the agent as the subject, this notion shifts our focus to responses 
from others. According to Scanlon’s account, an agent’s blameworthiness for some fault should be 
understood in terms of how that fault impairs his relationships with others. Consequently, blaming 
responses toward the agent involve relationship-alterations that are made appropriate by the fault for 
which the agent is blameworthy (e.g., withdrawal of trust, withdrawal of good will, etc.).44 Relevant 
here is Scanlon’s view that agents who unluckily bring about bad outcomes are no more blameworthy 
than their more fortunate counterparts, but that the bad outcomes can still increase the significance of 
their blameworthiness for those affected by the fault.45 Thus, perhaps different kinds of relationship-
alterations would be appropriate toward the BCI-agents as compared with their standard counterparts. 
Gary’s family might reasonably feel or behave differently toward someone who (like Typical Terry) 
momentarily planned to kill Gary but refrained from doing so than they do toward someone who (like 
BCI-Barry) actually brought about Gary’s death (even if unintentionally).46 They might reasonably find 
it difficult to reconcile with Barry, given that he was causally responsible for their family member’s 
death. They might even refuse to be in his presence, given his role in the tragedy.  
Lastly, consider the act of apology, which concerns how the agent might address others. At first 
glance, it may seem that it’s appropriate to apologize for something only if one is blameworthy for it. 
If Barry isn’t blameworthy for Gary’s death, then how could an apology for it be appropriate? Some 
theorists, however, defend the view that apologies can be appropriate even if no one is morally 
responsible for anything. On Derk Pereboom’s view, an apology can communicate an 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing, a wish that one hadn’t committed it, and a commitment to avoid 
such wrongdoing in the future.47 Bruce Waller draws attention to the fact that an apology can 
acknowledge that one’s wrongdoing stemmed from a flaw in one’s own character.48 These features of 
apology are consistent with the view that one is blameless for who one is and for what one does. 
Might apologies of this sort be appropriate for the BCI-agents discussed here? Each of them 
performs a mental action that reflects a flaw in their regard for others (e.g., at least a momentary 
willingness to carry out a morally wrong plan). Indeed, it might be entirely appropriate for them to 
apologize for these mental actions (one can imagine a remorseful BCI-Barry admitting to Gary’s family 
that he did murder Gary in his heart, as it were). But notice that an apology for this would also be 
appropriate for his counterpart, Typical Terry. The question we’re interested in here is whether it 
might also be appropriate for Barry to apologize for Gary’s death. And there are some reasons to think 
not. The movement of Barry’s arms isn’t an action; a fortiori it’s not a morally wrong action. 
Furthermore, it’s dubious that an accidental outcome (Gary’s death) can itself be expressive of a flaw 
in one’s character. While this doesn’t settle the matter, it’s less than clear that it would be appropriate 
for BCI-agents to apologize for these unlucky outcomes. And perhaps one of the sources of 
ambivalence here is that there are different kinds of apology. A certain kind of apology may come in 
the form of an expression of agent-regret: an expression that one deeply regrets that one’s own agency 
was part of the causal nexus that resulted in the tragic outcome. However, if these agents are (as I’ve 
argued) not at fault of the outcomes in question, the kind of apology that involves an acceptance of 
fault or an expression of guilt for the outcome would be less clearly appropriate. 
While these three possibilities are not exhaustive, reflecting upon them can help point the way 
forward in accounting for some of the conflicting intuitions we might have concerning whether to 





I have presented two unique problems of moral luck for agents who depend upon BCIs for the 
movement of their prosthetic limbs or the use of other mechanisms. These problems arise due to the 
peculiar possibility that BCIs allow for the mistaken recognition of distal intentions as proximal 
intentions. The solution I offer—that BCI-agents simply are not blameworthy in such cases—has the 
advantage of solving both problems at once. 
The considerations raised here extend beyond the focus of this paper, having broader implications 
for theorizing about moral luck. One lesson is that accepting outcome luck doesn’t require that we 
accept it in all its forms. Whether we should accept some species of outcome luck may partly depend 
upon whether it would affect certain types of agents uniquely, subjecting them to an additional layer 
of luck from which other agents are free. This discussion also elucidates an important requirement on 
reasonable foreseeability, a notion that plays a considerable role in the literature on the epistemic 
condition on moral responsibility.49 We may mistakenly assume that an outcome is reasonably 
foreseeable for an agent if that outcome can be foreseen upon the agent exercising some general 
capacity that the agent possesses. The considerations raised here, however, suggest that an outcome 
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